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A Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis  
of Totalization Agreements 
Abstract 
International social security totalization agreements eliminate double social security taxation for 
workers who reside and work in a different country than their home country. Because 
totalization agreements affect a number of economic agents in a variety of ways, we develop a 
cost-benefit framework of totalization agreements to facilitate the comparison and assessment 
of these impacts from a cost-benefit perspective. It lists the important stakeholders and the 
types of potential effects of the agreement on them, and attempts to quantify each type of effect 
for each stakeholder. The framework can be useful to policymakers and researchers to evaluate 
the economic implications of current or proposed future agreements, depending on economic 
conditions, characteristics of partner countries, and how they affect different stakeholders. The 
paper also summarizes what is currently known about the effects and related costs and benefits 
of totalization agreements. We provide relatively simple and straightforward example 
calculations for some of these effects, as well as calculations using a stylized micro-economic 
model for workers and a stylized macroeconomic model for firm investment and production 
allocation. In a few cases, we have both simple calculations of direct effects and model 
calculations that take more channels into account (under strong assumptions). They agree well, 
implying that the simple calculations capture most of the total effect. 
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International social security totalization agreements signed by the United States 
affect several economic agents. They benefit U.S. nationals who work temporarily in a 
foreign country and foreigners who work in the U.S. by avoiding dual contributions to the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) and the signing countries’ counterpart agencies, 
and by reducing the risk of not meeting eligibility requirements such as the minimum 
number of years of contributions (Jackson and Cash 2018). By facilitating the 
international reallocation of workers, totalization agreements can affect multinational 
firms’ incentives, foreign direct investment, and international capital flows. Lastly, by 
determining which foreign workers and which U.S. workers abroad contribute to Social 
Security payroll taxes, totalization agreements directly impact the revenues of the Social 
Security Administration.  
In prior work (Prados et al. 2019), we developed an international macroeconomic 
model to quantify the effects of totalization agreements on investment and capital and 
labor flows. In this project, we expand on this and design a framework for assessing 
current or proposed future totalization agreements. The cost-benefit framework 
classifies the potential impacts of totalization agreements, identifying the potential 
domains of impact and how different stakeholders in the public and private sectors 
would be affected 
We use the cost-benefit framework, together with the assembled empirical 
evidence, to map existing studies of totalization agreements within the framework. This 
helps the reader place existing studies and data into perspective. Furthermore, we add 
analyses of existing data. The study could be of interest to policymakers at all levels of 
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government, as well stakeholders in the private sector, who desire to understand how 
totalization agreements benefit different stakeholders, and how these benefits compare 
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The United States has signed more than 30 bilateral Social Security agreements, 
often referred to as “totalization agreements” (TA), with countries in Europe, Asia, North 
and South America, and Oceania. These agreements coordinate the U.S. Social 
Security program with other countries’ comparable programs. The first such agreement, 
with Italy, was signed in 1978, and the most recent one, with Iceland, in 2019. 
Agreements have been signed with both developed and developing nations.  
While some important details in the agreements differ across partner countries, 
their most important components are common to all of them. The agreements mainly do 
two things:1 First, they eliminate the dual social security taxation incurred when a worker 
must contribute to the social security systems of both the home and host countries, 
Second, the totalization of benefits reduces the risk of not qualifying to a pension due to 
“qualifying quarters” being spread across countries: Totalization agreements allow 
workers under certain cases to combine, or "totalize," coverage credits from both 
nations. 
Totalization agreements, thus, have clear benefits. Not being doubly taxed for 
social security substantially reduces the cost for multinationals and American 
companies with foreign affiliates and, importantly, for their workers. The dual social 
security tax liability is a widespread problem for U.S. multinational companies and the 
workers they send abroad, particularly because the U.S. tends to have a broader 
                                               
1 https://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html. This is also described in some 
detail in Prados et al. (2019). 
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coverage of expatriates2 than those of other countries since Americans sent abroad 
always need to pay social security contributions absent totalization agreements. 
The counterpart is that, absent a totalization agreement, some foreign workers 
being sent to the U.S. by companies based abroad would pay taxes to the U.S. Social 
Security Administration (SSA), but many of them will not have to do so once an 
agreement is in place. Without a totalization agreement, many of these foreign workers 
would contribute to the U.S. Social Security only for a few years and never qualify for 
benefits. Hence, some of those workers could create a windfall for the SSA. This 
windfall is lost under a totalization agreement; therefore, these treaties also create costs 
to consider. 
To gauge whether to sign a new agreement from the perspective of a U.S. 
decision-maker, one could compare the benefits for American companies and workers 
sent abroad with the potential revenue loss to SSA from foreign expatriates who are 
now exempted by the totalization agreement from contributing to it. However, economic 
theory and a recent literature suggest this may not paint the complete picture. 
Though these are two relatively straightforward, direct effects, the overall impacts 
of the agreements are likely to go beyond this and indirectly affect many other groups of 
people. By changing the costs faced by workers and firms, they are likely to have 
effects on a number of trade and macroeconomic variables. In fact, Seshadri (2019) 
finds effects on exports and imports (and hence, on trade balances) from different 
agreements, and Prados et al. (2019) show that their macroeconomic impacts can be 
                                               
2 https://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html 
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substantial and depend on the partner country’s characteristics. It is thus important to 
consider an agreement’s myriad effects and have a sense of how to weigh them.  
The list of stakeholders directly affected by totalization agreement includes the 
following:  U.S. nationals working temporarily in a foreign country and foreigners 
working in the U.S. who avoid dual social security contributions to two countries’ 
agencies; U.S nationals who benefit from a reduction in the risk of not meeting eligibility 
requirements such as the minimum number of years of contributions (Jackson and Cash 
2018); and the agencies in charge of social security, since they affect which foreign 
workers and which U.S. workers abroad contribute to social security payroll taxes. 
However, totalization agreements may have effects that go beyond this and hence 
affect broader stakeholder groups. By facilitating the international reallocation of 
workers, totalization agreements affect multinational firms’ incentives, foreign direct 
investment, and international capital flows. These indirect effects produce benefits (or 
costs) for firms and consumers beyond those directly affected by the agreements. 
The magnitude of the effects varies across stakeholder groups. The effects on 
the directly affected workers (those who are sent to the partner country) and on the 
social security agencies’ balances will be first order, while the indirect effects (such as 
the impacts through macroeconomic effects) will be smaller per capita but wide-
reaching.  
The cost-benefit framework can be useful from both normative and positive 
analyses. From the normative point of view, analysts could use our framework to 
conduct calculations of a prospective totalization agreement’s likely benefits and costs 
that would be accrued to domestic stakeholders and use that to recommend for or 
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against an agreement. From the positive analysis point of view, the cost-benefit 
framework could be used to understand the “political economy” that may determine why 
certain agreements are or are not signed, which may occur, for example, when a 
totalization agreement with certain countries would imply substantial costs to specific 
stakeholders that could oppose the signing of an agreement. 
2. Preamble 
2.1 Notes on terminology 
For better readability, we use a series of short-hands throughout this document. 
Some of these terms require clarification. 
First, we note that we use American workers through this document as a 
shorthand for all workers who are treated as such by U.S. law, which may include 
foreign nationals who are U.S. permanent residents. Likewise, a national of the partner 
country is any person who is treated as such by the partner country’s corresponding 
laws. 
Social security contributions in the U.S. go to trust funds that are used to 
disburse benefits. For instance, retirement and disability benefits are paid out of the 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) trust funds, 
respectively, which are formally separate but jointly managed. Therefore, we follow 
Pattison (2015) and treat these as one Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) trust fund. For readability, we refer to inflows and outflows of those funds as 
being benefits to the SSA, but that should be understood as benefits or costs to 
beneficiaries and other stakeholders of the OASDI funds. 
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2.2 How totalization agreements change the rules for expatriate workers and their 
employers 
In this section, we describe the two main changes that totalization agreements 
achieve. First, we describe how a totalization agreement affects current workers by 
allowing them to avoid double taxation, which also affects the cash flow to the social 
security agencies. Second, we describe how a totalization agreement can affect 
individuals who need to combine the contributions made to both countries’ social 
security in order to pass the threshold to receive benefits from the domestic social 
security administration. 
2.2.1 Double taxation 
Totalization agreements affect the taxes paid and benefits received by workers. 
For American workers who work for an American firm or are self-employed temporarily 
in a foreign country for a period of five years or less, totalization agreements do not 
affect their duties with respect to U.S. Social Security taxes. On the other hand, these 
workers will typically have to pay taxes to the partner country’s social security agency if 
there is no totalization agreement in place. If, on the other hand, the country does have 
a bilateral social security agreement with the U.S., the totalization agreement avoids 
double taxation for that worker.  
Table 2.1 shows all the separate cases. The highlighted rows represent the 
cases for which the totalization agreement makes a material difference for the 
stakeholders. 
The first case, depicted in the first row of the table, corresponds to Americans 
working for an American firm, who are sent to the partner country to work for an affiliate 
9 
of the parent company for a period no longer than five years. The same qualitative 
effects apply for self-employed Americans who conduct their work activities in the 
partner country with the intent of staying for five or fewer years. Hence, we include 
these in the same row, as the effects are of the same magnitude. 
For these workers, U.S. laws require the worker to make contributions to U.S. 
Social Security. Most foreign countries would also require them to make contributions to 
their local social security system3 and, hence, these workers are taxed doubly for social 
security. U.S. taxes are levied upon both workers and their employer, and this is the 
case in most other countries as well, so both the firm and the employee need to 
contribute to both systems.  
Totalization agreements eliminate double taxation for this group of workers, 
which totalization agreements refer to as “detached workers.”4 They are considered the 
exception to the rule and, thus, instead of paying contributions to the host countries, 
they do so to the one with greater economic attachment. Workers deemed to have 
greater economic attachment to the U.S. can obtain from SSA a Certificate of Coverage 
(CoC). While their period in the partner country lasts, they can use the CoC to 
demonstrate their exemption from that country’s social security taxes. Hence, 
totalization agreements change the situation for these workers from having to pay social 
security taxes to both systems to having to pay them only in the U.S. This row is 
                                               
3 This is certainly the case for Japan and Germany, but is also true of most countries with social 
security systems. 
4 Source: IRS https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/federal-state-local-
governments/totalization-agreements.  
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highlighted to denote a material change for this group of workers due to the totalization 
agreement. 
Generally, however, Americans who gain employment while abroad, for either an 
American or a domestic firm, are not required to pay contributions to the U.S. Social 
Security system. This is because, for them, the totalization agreement applies the 
territoriality rule which means that workers should pay taxes and be covered under the 
social security system of only one country, which is usually where they are employed 
(the exception being for detached workers covered in the case above). The totalization 
agreement does not affect them, as these workers cannot get a certificate of coverage 
and would likely still be paying only the foreign taxes. Hence, as shown in the second 
and third rows of the table, totalization agreements do not change the situation for them 
Row four also shows that there are no changes associated to a totalization 
agreement’s signing for workers employed long-term in the partner country. The 
totalization agreement determines the contributions to social security go to the country 
with “greater economic attachment” and, in the case of longer stays, the country of 
greater economic attachment becomes the host country: The totalization agreement 
does not change anything for these workers. Generally, the maximum period for a 
totalization agreement to apply is five years, though there are some cases when the 
five-year period in the CoC can be renewed.  
  
11 
Table 2.1. Social Security taxes: Effects of a Totalization agreement. Stylized case 
based on the agreements with Japan and Germany 
Types of worker Without TA With TA 
Americans working abroad temporarily (<5 
years) for U.S. firm and self-employed 
(temporarily)  
Pay OASDI taxes 
Pay foreign social 
security taxes  
Pay OASDI taxes 
Do not pay foreign 
social security taxes 
Americans working temporarily (<5 years) for 
American firm abroad when hired while abroad 
Do not pay OASDI 
taxes 
Pay foreign social 
security taxes  
Do not pay OASDI 
taxes  
Pay foreign social 
security taxes 
Americans working temporarily (<5 years) for 
foreign firm abroad, 
Or if hired while abroad 
Do not pay OASDI 
taxes 
Pay foreign social 
security taxes  
Do not pay OASDI 
taxes  
Pay foreign social 
security taxes 
Americans working abroad long term (>5 years) 
abroad for foreign firm or when hired abroad 
Do not pay OASDI 
taxes 
Pay foreign taxes 
Do not pay OASDI 
taxes 
Pay foreign social 
security taxes  
Americans working abroad long term (>5 years) 
for U.S. firm 
and self-employed going long term 
Pay OASDI taxes 
Pay foreign social 
security taxes 
Do not pay OASDI 
taxes 
Pay foreign social 
security taxes  
Partner-country nationals working temporarily 
in the U.S. 
Pay OASDI taxes  Do not pay OASDI 
taxes 
Partner-country nationals working long term 
(>5 years) in the U.S. 
Pay OASDI taxes Do not pay OASDI 
taxes 
 
The mirror image of these effects applies to the partner country’s nationals  who 
come to work in the U.S. In the absence of an international agreement, the U.S requires 
everyone working in the U.S. to pay Social Security taxes. Partner-country nationals 
working in the U.S. for less than five years would pay Social Security taxes if no 
totalization agreement is in place, but would be exempt from doing so under a 
totalization agreement as they could get a CoC from their country certifying that they are 
covered there and are not required to pay OASDI taxes. 
As shown in the last row of Table 2.1, for partner-country nationals who are 
coming to the U.S. long term, the totalization agreement would not change the 
requirement that they contribute to the U.S. Social Security system. 
12 
2.2.2 Totalization of benefits 
As explained in the introduction, the term “totalization” derives from the provision 
through which they allow workers to combine, or "totalize," coverage credits from both 
nations. This is also sometimes referred to as the “benefit provision” of totalization 
agreements 
The second large area of impacts of these agreements lies in this totalization 
aspect. The totalization of benefits helps people who would be at risk of not qualifying 
for social security benefits due to not earning enough credits, for instance, by not having 
contributed in the 40 qualifying quarters required in the U.S. to be eligible for Social 
Security retirement benefits. For an individual who spends time in many countries and 
hence contribute to several systems, it may be challenging to achieve the minimum 
quantity of qualifying quarters.  
2.3 A preamble on cost-benefit analysis 
Before creating the framework for totalization agreements, it is important to 
explain some basic concepts about cost-benefit analyses. Some of the terminology may 
be confusing for those unfamiliar with these concepts. For example, in the context of a 
cost-benefit analysis, the terms benefit and cost refers to the increased (reduced) 
welfare associated to the policy being analyzed, and not necessarily to the accounting 
benefit and cost. For example, we refer to income that could be expected to be accrued 
to an agency absent a totalization agreement as a “cost” even though it would not be an 
actual expense that is reported in the accounting. 
Cost-benefit analyses provide a framework to assess a policy or program. In 
order to do this, it is necessary to translate into dollar amounts the range of outcomes 
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and the degree that they produce different kinds of benefits (and costs). This is often 
challenging as it is often the case that these benefits and costs are nonmonetary. For 
the case of totalization agreements, most of the benefits and costs are financial and 
naturally reported in dollar terms. For instance, individuals who benefit from the removal 
of double taxation see an increased after-tax income, and the social security agencies 
that stop receiving those taxes see a cost in the form of foregone revenue. 
There are a couple of instances, however, where we do need to translate into 
dollars benefits or costs that are nonmonetary. Different methodologies are used for this 
purpose. These benefits and costs are often referred to as shadow prices. One such 
case is when totalization agreements change the location decisions of employees, 
which may result in income effects but also nonmonetary costs or benefits for moving 
abroad. We created a micromodel of workers’ lifetime utility in order to provide some 
insights into this. The second case is where totalization agreements result in increased 
international trade. Trade may result in higher income for firms, but may also result in 
increased options for consumers, which also has to be accounted for in the cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Cost-benefit analyses usually need to account for effects that are expected to 
happen throughout many years. To do so, they use discount rates to bring future values 
into todays’ dollars using Present Discounted Values. In contrast, most of the costs 
and benefits of totalization agreements occur contemporaneously (especially after an 
introduction phase), and there is no a priori reason to think that costs would rise more or 
less than benefits over time. Hence, for the purposes of constructing summary statistics 
such as the benefit-cost ratio, it is enough to calculate yearly costs and benefits. Since 
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costs and benefits would rise or fall proportionally across time, the cost-benefit ratio 
would not be affected by the discount rate used. Hence, we create the cost-benefit 
analysis framework using one-year values.5   
As mentioned in the introduction, the objective is to provide a framework that can 
be used to guide prospective cost-benefit analyses. Ultimately, those doing a cost-
benefit analysis will be interested in a summary indicator such as the benefit-cost ratio. 
However, a unique, certain result for this number will not always be achievable. First, 
because the data we recommend using may not be available. Second, because the 
parameters we identify from the literature have some uncertainty themselves or are only 
proxies.  
Perhaps at least as important as a final number, is the visualization of the 
different types of effects and how they affect different stakeholders. These can be used, 
for example, to understand why different stakeholders may have different positions with 
respect to the totalization agreements. This also allows one to analyze effect subsets, or 
effects for stakeholder subsets. For example, some uses of the framework may be to 
analyze only domestic stakeholders, or only look at the totalization agreements’ direct 
fiscal implications.  
                                               
5 We discuss one exception for analyses that integrate benefits from the microeconomic model 
derived from lifetime utility in a life-cycle model. In order to do this, we estimate the yearly 
amount that the expatriate would be willing to pay per year of their period abroad in order to 
equalize the lifetime utility flows under the scenarios of existence and absence of totalization 
agreements.  
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3. Building up a Framework for Cost-Benefit Analyses of Totalization 
Agreements 
The family of first-order totalization agreements’ effects are those that accrue to 
those directly affected by them: namely, 1) the workers (and firms who send them) no 
longer required to pay double social security taxes, 2) those who become eligible for 
social security benefits thanks to the totalization agreements, and 3) the social security 
agencies who stop receiving the extra contributions and have to pay the “totalized” 
benefits per points 1) and 2). These effects occur in relation to workers who would have 
been relocated regardless of the agreement’s existence. In this sense, we refer to them 
as the effects that occur regardless of behavioral responses. We refer to the workers 
(and firms who send them) whose temporary move to the partner country would occur 
regardless of the totalization agreement as always takers, adopting terminology 
introduced in the treatment effects literature by Angrist et al. (1996). 
A first step when assessing a new agreement is to count how many workers and 
firms would be affected absent behavioral responses to the changes induced, and then 
to assess the magnitude of these changes per worker or beneficiary.  
3.1 Benefits and costs arising from the activities of expatriate workers who would work 
abroad in the absence of a totalization agreement (always takers) 
In this first step, we consider the people who would be sent abroad temporarily 
by American firms, and those who would come from abroad to work here temporarily 
(and the foreign firms they work for) even if there was no totalization agreement.  
Absent a totalization agreement, these workers are subject to double taxation. 
They have to pay not only their contribution to U.S. Social Security, but also, in most 
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cases (depending on the host country’s laws), to the host country’s counterpart agency. 
With a totalization agreement, they would stop having to contribute to the host country.  
In the cost-benefit framework, this is a net benefit to the American worker and the 
firm where she works. The extent to which the benefit accrues to the worker or the firm, 
depends on whether the host country requires both the employee and employer to 
make contributions, and also to the extent that the firm increases the employee’s pay to 
compensate for the double taxation, which, theoretically, would depend on the worker’s 
outside options and the going market-clearing wage. 
The counterpart for this is the cost to the partner country’s social security agency, 
as they would lose the contribution from the American worker and firm. The benefit to 
the firm and worker is highlighted in green in the first row of Table 3.1, while the cost to 
the foreign social security agency is highlighted in red. 
The corresponding costs and benefits relating to the foreign workers sent to the 
U.S. who would have been sent regardless of the presence of a totalization agreement 
are shown in the second row. It summarizes the costs and benefits associated with the 
elimination of double taxation for this group. Absent a totalization agreement, the 
“always taker” partner-country expat contributes to U.S. Social Security and may be 
double taxed, depending on whether her home country requires her to contribute. A 
totalization agreement would allow the foreign worker to contribute to her home social 
security program and not to the American one. So, it would be a net benefit for the 
foreign worker as she either avoids double taxation or is able to channel her contribution 
to the program she would benefit from, and is a cost for the SSA as it stops receiving a 
contribution.  
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Table 3.1. The Impacts of totalization agreements through the effects on “always-
taker” expatriate workers.  
Types of worker Without 
TA 
With TA Impacts of TA 
Americans working 










Do not pay 
foreign 
taxes 
Increase disposable income for 
American expats/reduced expenses 
for American firm 
Reduction in income for foreign social 
security institution 
Partner-country nationals 




Do not pay 
OASDI 
taxes 
Increase income for foreign expat 
coming to America 
Reduction in income for SSA 
 
3.2 Benefits and costs arising through the effect of increasing expatriate worker flows 
(the added-expatriate worker effect) 
The list of benefits and costs does not stop with the direct effects discussed in 
section 3.1. Totalization agreements also can produce behavioral impacts. In the same 
way the quantity demanded for a good increases when the price is lowered, the number 
of expatriates being sent in and out of the U.S. responds to a totalization agreement’s 
signing that reduces the cost for the firm and employee of being sent abroad. Hence, 
we can anticipate totalization agreements to have an effect on the number of affected 
employees and firms. We refer to this as the added expatriate worker effect, and to 
these additional expatriate workers as induced expatriates in the sense that it is the 
presence of the agreement that made them (or “induced them”) to move abroad (or their 
employer to send them). 
Furthermore, induced expatriates’ benefits and costs will be different than those 
of always takers. For workers induced to move, the benefit is not higher than for the 
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always takers, and it may be lower. The benefit for them lies somewhere between zero 
and the benefit for the always-taker. We know there is still a benefit for them, since with 
the totalization agreement they still have the option not to move, so given that they do, it 
means that they are better off. In economics, this is called the revealed preference 
argument.6 To see why the benefit has to be lower than that for always-takers, consider 
the fact that, absent a totalization agreement, they would not have moved so by 
definition the move’s utility was negative. Call this utility u and it is a shorthand for the 
combined utility for the employer and the employee. The totalization agreement means 
a benefit of the amount of reduced taxation, call it TA, which is the always takers’ total 
benefit. Call the benefit for the induced workers TI = u + TA. Since they decide to move 
given a totalization agreement, we know that 0 < TI = u + TA < TA, which implies that 
the benefit for them will be somewhere between zero and the always takers’ increase in 
disposable income. To avoid making the discussion here too technical, we refer the 
interested reader to Appendix 1, where we describe a microeconomic theoretical model 
of these decisions, and where we show how one can go about measuring or estimating 
the utility’s value. 
From this particular effect (first row in Table 3.2), for the foreign social security 
institution, the costs would be null as it is no longer the case that, absent an agreement, 
they would have collected contributions. In this case, they do not collect contributions 
regardless of the totalization agreement’s existence, so the positive benefit for the 
                                               
6 As before, we note that how much of this utility accrues to the employer or the employee 
cannot be disentangled, and it is possible that that the employer has to pay an extra incentive 
in order to realize this “utility.” 
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induced workers does not have a counterpart negative effect for either social security 
agency. 
The mirror image effects accrue for the foreign incoming expat coming 
temporarily. The benefit for the expat whose decision is affected by the signing of the 
totalization agreement is also positive but lower than for those who would have come to 
the U.S. regardless. Likewise, there is no cost associated to the U.S. Social Security 
Administration since it would not be receiving contributions in either case. 
Table 3.2. The Impacts of totalization agreements through the added expatriate 
worker effect. 
Types of worker Without TA With TA Impacts of TA 
Americans working 
abroad temporarily (<5 
years) for U.S. firm  
Stays in U.S. 
Pay OASDI taxes 
Does not pay foreign 
taxes  
Moves abroad 
Pay OASDI taxes 
Does not pay foreign 
taxes 
Positive benefit to 





No effect in income 
for social security 
institutions 
Foreign nationals 
working temporarily in 
the U.S. 
Stays in foreign 
country 
Does not pay OASDI 
taxes  
Pays taxes in home 
SS agency 
Moves to U.S. 
Do not pay OASDI 
taxes 
Pays taxes in home 
SS agency. 
Positive benefit to 
foreign expat 
coming to America 
No effect in income 
for social security 
institutions 
 
3.3 Benefits and costs from the totalization provision 
The other direct impact that totalization agreements have is through their 
“totalization” aspect. This represents a benefit for some former workers who would not 
otherwise have qualified for disability or retirement benefits. For some people, this 
aspect of totalization agreements means that they will receive at least some benefit 
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income instead of nothing. The Social Security Administration then faces a financial 
cost, as they need to pay some benefits that they otherwise would not have to. Note 
that this is different from the benefit above, where the cost that mirrors the benefit from 
removed double taxation is borne by the partner country agency. Here, it is borne by the 
SSA.  
The social security agencies pay benefits proportionally for the years contributed 
to each country. Hence, someone who totalizes the quarters to meet the minimum 
required periods may receive payments from both agencies. As described in Jackson 
and Cash (2018): “the amount of the U.S. benefit payable is proportional only to those 
periods of coverage earned in the United States. The partner country similarly pays a 
partial, or prorated, benefit when combined coverage establishes entitlement.” 
The first row of Table 3.3 shows the benefits for the American individuals who 
due to the totalization agreement, are able to combine the contributions and receive 
some benefits from social security programs. As indicated in the second row of Table 
3.3, for the foreign former workers who become able to “totalize,” the benefit is accrued 
to themselves, while the cost is borne by the foreign social security agency (or 




Table 3.3. The Impacts of totalization agreements through the benefit provision 
Types of worker Without TA With TA Impacts of TA 
Americans who 
become able to 
“totalize” benefits due 
to the totalization 
agreement 
May fall short of the 
number of contributed 
quarters and be 
ineligible for benefits 
May surpass the 
threshold of 40 
contributed quarters 
required for 
retirement benefits in 
SSA and/or the 
threshold to receive 
benefits from partner 
country 










nationals who become 
able to “totalize” 
benefits due to the 
totalization agreement 
May fall short of the 
number of contributed 
years and be ineligible 
for benefits 
May surpass the 
threshold set by the 
partner country for 
benefit eligibility  
and/or threshold of 40 
contributed quarters 
required for benefits 
from SSA 





for the partner 
agency and SSA 
 
3.4 Further benefits and costs: Firms and aggregate effects — multinational production 
and international trade. 
While taking into account the “added-expat” effect certainly makes for a more 
complete evaluation of the agreements, it does not encompass all possible factors that 
may affect the costs and benefits. Totalization agreements affect incentives and 
behaviors of multinational firms and facilitate labor reallocation for multinational firms 
(Carey 1993, Larkins 1993, Russo and D’Onofrio 1995). Recently, two studies have 
investigated the possibility that totalization agreements may have macroeconomic 
effects (Seshadri 2019, and Prados et al. 2019). This implies that other stakeholders in 
a country may be affected in addition to the expatriates, the firms that employ them, and 
social security administrations’ finances. 
Totalization agreements lower the costs of firms sending workers to affiliates in 
the partner country. If the cost reduction implied by the elimination of double taxation is 
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enough to make investments in that country profitable enough,7 this may allow firms to 
expand their investments abroad and benefit from lower production costs abroad, and 
likewise in the other direction. Multinational production serves foreign markets by 
allowing firms to avoid such costs as transport that affect international trade flows. This 
reflects a gain accrued for the firms that make such investments, as shown in the first 
cell of the benefit-cost matrix in Table 3.4. On the other hand, this could also mean 
more competition for some same-industry firms operating in the host country, while 
other local firms may gain from synergies with the additional investments. Overall, FDI 
may have benefits for the population at large to the extent it contributes to economic 
growth.  
The effects would be reversed for incoming FDI. The firm making the 
investments likely gained from the improved investment opportunities. There may be 
some domestic firms with losses due to the increased competition, but also ones that 
may benefit from production chains or other synergies with firms that employ the foreign 
workers sent to the U.S. To the extent that the foreign investment contributes to the 
economy’s dynamism, there may be benefits interspersed through the population via 
economic growth. 
  
                                               
7 The allocation of managerial power in the model in Prados et al. (2019) implies that the firms 
equalize after-tax benefits from domestic and foreign operations. 
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producing in the 
country. 
Adding the impacts 
from the affected 
firms, overall 
efficiency, etc. 
   General gains to 
the population 




Totalization agreements can have impacts on international trade. From a 
theoretical perspective, the net revenues to the firm’s investments are payments to 
domestic factors abroad, and that has first order effects on the capital account and the 
trade balance. Additionally, it is possible that multinationals’ foreign affiliates use 
imported inputs from their home country (intrafirm trade). Multinational firms may also 
use a third country as a “bridge,” or export platform, to serve a particular market from 
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there.8 Lastly, facilitating the flow of expatriate workers across partnered nations may 
allow some firms to promote their goods for exporting to the partner country, establish 
partnerships for multinational production chains, etc.  
Effects on trade then expand the group of affected stakeholders to much broader 
swaths of the population. The agreements impact not only the workers and firms that 
are directly affected, but also the competitor firms, and consumers. Costinot and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2014) conduct a survey of the literature measuring gains from trade. 
Table 3.5 below outlines some of these effects. An increase in exports plausibly benefits 
the exporting firm and possibly its workers, but it may benefit other workers indirectly as 
well —for example, if it adds to labor demand. An increase in imports may reflect 
consumers benefitting from new, better, or cheaper products produced in the partner 
country. In both cases, the increased activity may simply reflect a relocation of product’s 
production or of an intermediate good, where a company is relocating part of their 
production to or from the partner country. 
 
  
                                               
8 Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) refer to the empirical evidence for intrafirm trade and 
include these channels in their model. 
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As we thread into these broader, more dispersed effects, the number of 
stakeholders and the minutia of how different groups of people are affected grow 
exponentially, and accounting of the individual costs and benefits becomes impossible. 
We can, however, aim to approximate the overall direction and magnitude of costs and 
benefits by relying on economic theory. We discuss this more in the following section. 
Of course, the magnitude of the totalization agreements’ aggregate effects may 
be small in per capita terms, especially if the partner country is a small economy. 
However, these effects could be important from a cost-benefit perspective. First, even if 
they are small in per capita terms, they affect a large number of people. Second, if they 
are small overall, they may still be large relative to the agreements’ costs (for instance, 
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the totalization agreements’ fiscal costs to SSA would represent a minuscule fraction of 
GDP). We discuss the valuation of the costs and benefits in more detail in the following 
section. 
3.5 Combining the individual effects into an overall framework 
We combine the set of impacts described in Tables 3.1-3.5 into an overall 
framework describing the wide set of impacts that totalization agreements may have, 
which are shown in Table 3.6. The organizing principle is based on the approach used 
in Karoly and Perez-Arce (2016). The framework forms a basis for evaluating 
totalization agreements by comparing multiple impacts, shown in the table’s rows. The 
columns represent the general stakeholder groups. The matrix cells show the benefits 
and costs emanating from each effect group to each stakeholder group.  
The analyst may choose to focus on only a subset of the costs and benefits, for 
instance by only analyzing the ones that accrue agents in one of the two countries, or 
focus only on the costs and benefits for the public sector, or more broadly on effects for 
all economic agents.  
We divide the table into two panels due to space, as placing all the columns 
horizontally would make the table too wide. The first panel includes only U.S. 
stakeholders, while the second panel includes the partner country’s stakeholders. Note, 
however, that the partner country’s panel is conceptually the same as the one for the 
home country, although of course the numbers change due to different tax rates, 
income levels, trade levels, etc., as we discuss in the following section. 
The rows correspond to the impacts discussed above. They are divided into the 
four large groups corresponding to the earlier tables: effects on the workers sent 
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abroad, effects on the firms who send workers abroad, the Social Security 
Administration finances (or its corresponding agency abroad), and the population at 
large. 
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Table 3.6. General cost-benefit matrix  
Effect group Benefits and costs for U.S. stakeholders 




U.S. Affected firms (those 
that employ expats to 
partner country) 




takers expats  
The income  of U.S. 
always takers expats 
increases by the 
reduction in amount 




Forego revenue by the 
amount they used to receive 
from expats from partner 
country 
U.S. firms experience a reduction 
in amount they owe to foreign 
social security organization from 
the expats they would have sent 
with or without totalization 





The income of induced 
expats increases 
between 0 and the 
amount  of the increase 
for U.S. always taker 
expats. (shared with 
firm) 
-- 
Reduced cost for firms from the 
workers they decide to send 
(shared with expat) 
-- 
Impacts from the 
benefit provision 
Some former workers 
become able to receive 
benefits  by combining 
qualifying quarters to 
surpass 40 quarter 
minimum 
Pay benefit to beneficiaries 




Some firms see increased 
business opportunities, while 
others face additional competition 
Workers can see both increased and reduced 
opportunities from competition. 
Consumers: increased options and better 
prices. 
 
Overall, theory tends to predict overall gains to 
trade.  
Macroeconomic 
effects: FDI  
  
Depending on the net effect of the 
agreement on FDI, some firms see 
increased business opportunities of 
investing abroad, while others face 
additional competition in the local 
market. 
Workers: could see new job opportunities. 
Consumers: increased options and lower 
prices. 
 





   
More productive opportunities for domestic 
factors may translate in more consumption and 
investment opportunities. 
(Continued on next page.) 
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Table 3.6. General Cost-benefit matrix (continued) 
Effect group 
Benefits and costs for partner country stakeholders 
Expats Social security agency 
Firms that employ expats 
to U.S. 
Partner country 
economy and population 
at large 
Impacts from current 
always taker expats  
The income of partner country always takers 
expats increase by the reduction in amount 
they owe to the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (shared with firm) 
Forego revenue by the 
amount they used to receive 
from expats from the US 
Partner country firms experience a 
reduction in amount they owe to 
foreign social security administration 
from the expats they would have 
sent with or without totalization 




The income of foreign “induced expats” 
increases between 0 and the amount of the 
increase for “always taker” expats (shared with 
firm) 
-- 
Reduce costs for firms from the 
workers they decide to send (share 
with expat) 
-- 
Impacts from the 
benefit provision 
Some become able to receive benefits  by 
combining qualifying quarters to surpass the 
local laws minimum required years of 
contribution 
Pay benefit to beneficiaries 




Some firms see increased business 
opportunities, while others face 
additional competition 
Workers can see both increased 
and reduced opportunities from 
competition. 
Consumers: increased options 
and lower prices. 
 
Overall, theory tends to predict 
overall gains to trade.  
Macroeconomic 
effects: FDI  
  
Some firms see increased business 
opportunities, while others face 
additional competition 
Workers: could see new job 
opportunities. 
Consumers: increased options 
and lower prices. 
 
Overall, theory tends to predict 
overall “gains from trade”. 
Macroeconomic 
effects: Gross National 
Product 
   
More productive opportunities for 
foreign factors translate in more 




This framework facilitates an objective perspective on the potential favorable and 
unfavorable effects of signing totalization agreements with countries of different 
characteristics, and evaluating how the partner country’s characteristics affect different 
stakeholders. The totalization agreement literature is still in its infancy and, thus, there is 
still a large amount of uncertainty about the values of the costs and benefits. Those 
interested in doing prospective analyses using this framework may face more or less 
challenges finding the appropriate data and estimates depending on the country in 
question. But the framework may help analysts and policymakers in evaluating possible 
totalization agreements and thinking through all of the likely impacts.  
This framework entails a piece-wise quantification of the effects for each cell 
component in Table 3.6. We will perform an exercise quantifying some of these effects 
for two categories of countries, developed and developing economies. The framework 
will allow for sensitivity analyses to account for uncertainty surrounding the quantified 
effects and by partner country’s characteristics. This exercise will also be illustrative of 
how the framework can be used to analyze potential treaties with new partner countries. 
4. Filling in the Framework: Valuation of costs and benefits 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the benefits and costs that could emerge 
from the different effects of the totalization agreements. In this chapter, we discuss their 
valuation. 
In order to assess the values for each matrix cell, we make use of data or rely on 
theory when the appropriate data is not available. Hence, we analyze what economic 
theory predicts, what existing economic research on totalization agreements predicts, 
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what we can interpolate from research in other economic domains, and what remains 
unknown (the research gaps). 
We discuss the extent to which some of these values can be estimated, or 
approximated, with existing evidence, as well as when it is not yet possible to do that. 
The latter will identify gaps that could be filled with further research. We rely on results 
from the two prior studies (Seshadri 2019 and Prados et al. 2019) that include estimates 
of impacts on trade and macroeconomic variables. A key piece missing from existing 
research is an analysis of the totalization agreements’ effects on workers’ decisions and 
welfare. For this, we produce an original, stylized life-cycle model to evaluate the 
welfare effects of being relocated abroad as a function of some of the agreement 
characteristics.  
We use data from the U.S. and foreign CoC; tax-filing data from the Internal 
Revenue Service; data on certain types of nonimmigrant visas, by nationality, issued by 
the U.S. Department of State; and data on social security benefits paid. 
We follow the structure of Chapter 3 in terms of the discussion of groups of costs 
and benefits.  
4.1 Calculating effects on and responses of workers with a microeconomic model 
As discussed in Chapter 3, totalization agreements have several direct effects on 
individual workers, but workers and firms can also change their behavior as a result of 
the totalization agreement’s, introduction which may amplify or reduce the direct effects. 
Depending on workers’ and firms’ responses, there may be consequences for payroll 
and income tax receipt and social security benefits paid. While many first-order effects 
can be calculated by relatively simple means, calculating effects resulting from 
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behavioral changes requires a model for individual worker behavior, preferably a life-
cycle model along the lines of, for example, Fonseca et al. (2020), French (2005), 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2009), and Scholz et al. (2006), augmented with totalization 
agreements’ provisions of and other relevant aspects. This can then be combined with a 
macroeconomic model of aggregate firm behavior, for example, the one in Prados et al. 
(2019). Building a realistic individual model as rich as the ones in the cited sources is 
outside this study’s scope, but for illustrative purposes, we develop a simplified life-cycle 
model that allows us to compute some hypothetical scenarios. Appendix I contains a 
description of the model. It should be emphasized that, because this model omits many 
relevant aspects,9 these are not realistic predictions but illustrations of the kind of 
computations one could do with a more realistic model. In the following, we present 
some model calculations to supplement more direct calculations of first-order effects. 
4.2 Valuing the impacts of totalization agreements through the effects on always-taker 
expatriate workers  
We start by tackling the most direct effects of totalization agreements, those that 
accrue to the firms and workers who would be affected even absent any effects on 
behaviors. 
These benefits are those that accrue to U.S. workers, the “always takers” sent by 
their American employer to work in the partner country and who would do so regardless 
of whether there is a signed totalization agreement or not. Accounting for the benefit for 
this matrix cell requires an estimation of the magnitude of the benefit per worker as well 
                                               
9 Some key limitations are that there is no uncertainty in the model and there are no borrowing 
constraints aside from a single, lifetime budget constraint. 
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as an estimate of the number of affected individuals. An approximation of this cell’s total 
value for  could be expressed as NA×TA, where NA is the number of American always 
takers sent to the partner country, and TA is the average benefit — or shadow price — 
per worker (regardless of how that benefit is distributed between employer and 
employee).  
Estimating NA, the number of “always takers,” is straightforward conceptually for 
prospective cost-benefit analyses, as it equals the number of expatriates who, under the 
status quo, pay taxes to both nations. For retrospective analyses of countries with 
recently signed agreements, it can be approximated by the number of expatriates 
subject to double contribution in the years prior to the agreement. For agreements 
signed a long time ago, however, the number of expatriates before the agreement may 
not present a reasonable approximation as the economies may have changed 
substantially. Hence, it may be preferable to approximate it by using the number of 
individuals with a certificate of coverage (CoC), then multiply it by one minus the inverse 
of the totalization agreement’s expected impact on expat flows. This is discussed in the 
next subsection, but for now we take this number to be approximately 0.8, for illustrative 
purposes. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the benefit per individual for always takers amounts 
to the taxes they save from avoiding the double taxation. To illustrate our calculations, 
consider the following example. Suppose that the partner country’s social security tax 
rate is 20%, half of which is payable by the employee and half by the firm, and that the 
expat has an income equivalent to USD$100,000. Absent a totalization agreement, she 
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would have to pay $10,000 to the partner country’s social security administration in 
addition to the amount she owes to the SSA.  
More generally, an individual i with income Yi, and paying foreign social security 
tax rate r would benefit directly by Yi×r. The firm that employs her — which is, absent a 
totalization agreement, subject to an employer contribution to the partner country social 
security — would also benefit by the expatriate worker’s income multiplied by the host 
country’s applicable tax rate. The tax rate payable by the employer, rf, may be different 
from r. The amount payable by the firm can be summarized by the expression Yi×rf. The 
combined direct benefit for the firm and the employee is TAi = Yi×(r + rf). 
Most employers compensate their workers for their additional tax burden, if any 
(KPMG International 2019, p. 80). Thus, absent a totalization agreement, most 
employers would have compensated the worker’s wage so that her take-home pay was 
the same as before moving. In this case, the employee would have had a zero direct 
benefit from the totalization, but the total benefit TAi, would be even larger, as the 
employer would have had to pay an overpayment, Δ,s so that the take-home for the 
employee remains the same. The total benefit TAi then equals (1 + Δ)×Yi×(r + rf), where 
Δ = r/(1 - r).10  
  
                                               
10 Note that countries commonly use a “wage-ceiling” to determine social security contribution 
liabilities, which implies that the tax rate is imposed only to income below the ceiling. To the 
extent that a wage ceiling applies, the benefit would be applicable to the minimum of (1 + Δ) × 
Yi and the wage ceiling. 
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Table 4.1 A stylized example of valuing benefits for the case of the totalization 
agreement with Germany and Chile for always takers (and cost for the partner 
country social security agency) 






Yi  b 
 





Germany 9.3% 9.3% 98,175 22,433 8,164 183.1M 
Chile 13.54% (total employer 
+ employee) 
36,000 4,875 816 3.98M 
Notes: a Source: ILO (2017) and SSA (2018c). The figure for Chile corresponds to the 
mandatory individual account program which applies to workers joined the workforce after 1983. 
b The average income among CoC holders for Germany is more than $200,000 but the “wage 
ceiling” in Germany is EUR 82,500 according to PWC Worldwide Tax Summaries, reviewed on 
July 09, 2020, https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/germany/individual. This amounts to USD 98,175 
at the 1.19 EUR to USD exchange rate valid on Aug 14, 2020 (Morningstar). For Chile, the 
wage ceiling is 908.4 Unidades de Fomento (IFs), which corresponded to about $36,000 USD 
as of 2017: c This was calculated by multiplying the inverse of the expected effect of TAs on 
expat flows ~0.8 (see next subsection) times the number of CoC for Germany and Chile (see 
next subsection). 
 
Table 4.1 presents an example of a retrospective calculation of the total direct 
benefit for firms and workers accrued through the always takers effects. These are all 
expressed at the yearly level. The example uses numbers and estimates for Germany, 
where the rate equals approximately 9.3% levied on the worker and 9.3% levied on the 
firm, so both r and rf equal 9.3% (SSA 2018b). Though the average yearly income 
among expatriates to Germany is much higher than that, social security taxes are only 
levied upon the first EUR 82,500 or almost USD 100,000 per current (2020) exchange 
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rates.11 In this case though even if employers were providing over-payment to 
compensate for the foreign taxes, the benefit would still be calculated from income 
topped at the $98,175 level, which is multiplied by the 18.6% total tax rate to obtain TAi. 
We estimate there to be about 10,220 expatriates currently enjoying the benefit. 
Assuming about 80% of them are always takers, that would give a total benefit TA of 
about $183 million. 
For those interested in estimating this value for a prospective cost-benefit 
analysis for a country without a signed totalization agreement, the main figures to obtain 
or proxy are the following: 1) the social security tax rate in the candidate country as it 
applies to both the employee and the employer; 2) the wage ceiling of American 
expatriate managers’ likely wages in that country. Per the numbers reported in Prados 
et al. (2019), American expatriates’ wages tend to be higher than the wage ceilings for 
most countries, therefore, the candidate country’s wage ceiling may be used if there is 
one. The average earnings for the median expatriate workers in other developed 
countries in 2017 was $158,429 and the corresponding figure for the average worker 
was $307,557.12 However, it was lower for the six countries with relatively lower GDP 
per capita, where the corresponding figures were $99,414 and $150,850 respectively.13 
                                               
11 The wage ceiling in 2019 was EUR 82,500 according to PWC Worldwide Tax Summaries, 
reviewed on July 09,2020, https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/germany/individual. This amounts to 
USD 98,175 at the 1.19 EUR to USD exchange rate valid on Aug 14, 2020 (Morningstar). 
12 We calculated this as the average (not weighted by population) of the mean and median 
Medicare earnings for the following countries: Denmark, France, Netherlands, Finland, 
Greece, South Korea, Japan, Italy, Canada, Austria, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
Australia, Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. The data was 
provided by the Social Security Administration. 
13 The average was taken for the following countries: Chile, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
and Slovakia. 
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One of these numbers could be used, depending on the characteristics of the candidate 
country. The last required figure is the likely number of always takers. One possible 
source for this is the number of individuals who in the most recent year used the foreign 
income tax deduction from that country in their tax returns, which is available from the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  
These calculations do not consider that other taxes, such as income tax, need to 
be paid for the additional income (increasing the totalization agreement’s effect), and 
that the higher earnings, if below the SSA wage ceiling, would lead to higher Social 
Security benefits later on. In the subsection below, we discuss how these effects can be 
valued, and the extent to which they can or cannot be important for overall cost-benefit 
calculations.  
4.2.1 Measuring indirect effects arising from over-compensation (1+ Δ) 
So far, we have not had to account for the magnitude of Δ, because in the cases 
studied, Y surpasses the wage ceiling and, hence, the quantity (1+ Δ)×Yi has not 
translated into a different TA number. However, there are other indirect benefits and 
costs that can arise, and may or may not be of quantitative importance when Δ > 0. 
Note that here we are discussing only the compensation for social security tax 
rates, though firms may provide additional compensation for moving costs, children’s 
schooling, or any other compensation that firms may provide to expatriates. These other 
compensation forms would not be affected by totalization agreements and, hence, there 
is no need to consider them here. 
In particular, consider the case of a firm compensating their employees going to 
nontreaty countries with Δ = r/(1 - r). These workers, in addition to paying the partner 
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country’s social security payroll taxes, also have to pay regular income taxes. Denote 
the average income tax rate in the partner country for someone with the income level Yi 
with τ. The expatriate worker then pays income taxes in the amount of τ × (1 + Δ) × Yi. 
This uses the simplifying assumption that there is a flat tax rate, whereas in reality, 
income tax schedules are more complex, but this simplification is useful for the 
purposes of this discussion.14 Now assume the country signs a totalization agreement 
with the U.S., and as a result, the firm reduces the compensation to Yi. In this case, the 
income taxes paid to the partner country are only τ × Yi. This represents a benefit to the 
firm/expatriate employee of τ × Δ × Yi, and a cost to the partner country’s government of 
the same amount.  
Consider the numbers used above for Germany in Table 4.1. We have NA = 
8,164 always takers expatriate workers to Germany. U.S. firms would have to 
overcompensate with a Δ =0.0925/(1-0.0925) = 10.2%. Since the compensation only 
needs to be done for the portion of income subject to social security contributions, we 
use Yi = 98,175. Hence, the total benefit from this effect would equal 0.102 × 98,175 × τ. 
Given the high income of expatriate workers, τ is better approximated by the top income 
tax rate instead of the average income rate, though in practice the average income tax 
rate will be slightly lower than that. Using the rates as reported by PWC tax 
                                               
14 Also, the U.S. has worldwide taxation of its citizens, so this assumes that foreign taxes are 
higher than U.S. taxes and can be fully deducted, such that the individual does not pay U.S. 
income taxes. Our micromodel does allow for progressivity in income tax, but makes the 
simplifying assumption that the combined partner country and U.S. income tax is the same as 
U.S. income tax would be for the same income had the individual lived and worked in the U.S. 
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summaries,15 we calculate τ to equal 0.3056. Hence, the benefit to the U.S. worker/firm 
from this concept would equal $3,104, a small but non-negligible fraction of the benefit 
of $22,433 calculated above. By multiplying it by NA, this results in an additional $25.3 
million to add to the cell of benefits accrued to the domestic workers/firms (see Table 
4.2 below).  
Table 4.2 Additional benefits to U.S. always takers and their employers arising 
from a reduction in income taxes from the drop in Δ 
Country τ a Υi b Δ ΝΑ Total direct 
benefit (in USD 
millions) 
Germany 0.31 98,175 0.102 8,164 25.3 
Chile 0.355 36,000 0.12 816 1.25 
Note: a We use the average (Medicare) earnings (data from SSA) of American expatriates and 
the income tax schedules for individuals in Germany to calculate it. For Chile, we use 35.5%, 
which is the marginal income tax rate for all income above 8,000. Expatriates to Chile have 
average earnings of 235,000.b We use the wage ceiling applicable in Germany and Chile, 
respectively. 
Note that, as is the case for the benefit logged in Table 4.1, this benefit has its 
mirror image and should be logged as a negative for the partner country, though in this 
case the revenue loss does not accrue to the social security agency but to the public 
sector income in general. 
Similar calculations can be made for the partner country’s expatriates coming 
into the U.S. The numbers for those flows in the case of Germany are similar. The 
                                               
15 https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/germany/individual. To calculate this, we use the average 
(Medicare) earnings (data from SSA) of American expatriates to Germany in 2017 which was 
$209,398.70, rather than the wage ceiling since this does not apply to income taxes. We use 
the tax rate schedule for individual filers. 
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description of those estimates is presented later in the text. But as an advance, we 
calculate the number of always takers from Germany to be 9,300, and the reported 
benefit to them, and the federal government’s cost from foregone revenue to be of 
$23.9M.  
When the expatriate flows to and from the U.S. and the partner country are of 
about the same magnitude, and expatriate wages of the are also about the same level 
(as is the case in the numbers for Germany shown earlier), these costs and benefits will 
be similar and, thus, largely cancel out in aggregate for each country’s stakeholders. 
However, this calculation will be affected by the different tax rates, which explains the 
relatively larger benefit for German stakeholders shown in these calculations. On the 
other hand, in cases where more workers are sent abroad than come in, and with larger 
earnings of the domestic over the partner country expatriates, as is the case with Chile, 
the totalization agreements will provide a higher benefit for the domestic firms and 
workers, and higher costs for the partner country’s public sector income,  which will 
suffer from the foregone revenue. 
4.2.2 Allowing for behavioral effects among always takers 
The always takers do not have a behavioral response in the sense that these 
workers would be going on a foreign assignment whether or not there is a totalization 
agreement. However, as explained above, other potential responses do not depend on 
whether there is a totalization agreement. These responses start with additional pay for 
the employees to compensate them for the additional costs, which differ in the two 
regimes. The worker can then decide to spend the additional income in the period 
abroad, or save (part of) it and spend it later. If the worker earns below the Social 
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Security maximum taxable income, the additional earnings also induce additional 
benefits after retirement. 
To illustrate the types of calculations involved in accounting for these additional 
pathways, we computed some scenarios using the microeconomic model introduced in 
section 4.1. According to BGRS (2016, p. 50), the largest group of employees on 
foreign assignments is age 40-49, and as mentioned earlier, the earnings of U.S.-based 
workers sent abroad tend to be high. Therefore, in our computations, we consider a 
college graduate sent to Germany or Chile for a five-year assignment starting at age 45, 
who in the U.S. would earn $209,398.70 (the mean earnings on CofC for assignments 
in Germany) or $232,176.04 (the mean earnings on CofC for assignments in Chile), 
respectively, at age 45. 
Warneke and Schneider (2011) find that expatriates’ preferences for 
compensation packages are very heterogeneous in Germany and Spain, and there is 
also large variation in satisfaction with compensation packages (Suutari and Tornikoski 
2011), despite these packages tending to be very expensive for the employers (e.g., 
Bonache and Zárraga-Oberty 2017). From this literature, we do not obtain specific 
guidance about the disutility of being sent abroad that can be used in our model, and 
therefore, we perform our calculations for a few such values — no disutility, disutility 
corresponding with a 20% drop of consumption, and disutility corresponding with a 50% 
drop of consumption. 
We then compute lifetime utility if the employee would stay in the U.S., and 
subsequently find the smallest value of δ (additional gross earnings relative to staying in 
the U.S.) such that the individual would weakly prefer the foreign assignment (i.e., 
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results in the same lifetime utility), both with and without a totalization agreement. We 
then compute the resulting employer cost. 
Our calculations do not account for various employer costs unrelated to earnings 
or taxes paid, such as travel and moving cost reimbursements and housing allowances. 
We assume that these are the same with or without a totalization agreement, and play 
no role in the cost-benefit analysis. 
Table 4.3 shows the results of this exercise. There were no effects on retirement 
age, which was 70 in all cases. This corresponds well with what we know about high-
income high-educated individuals, who retire later. The foreign assignment costs 
increase rapidly with the disutility of working abroad and the need for employer 
compensation for this. However, this increase is similar with and without totalization 
agreement, so cost reductions due to the agreement are much less sensitive to this 
unknown parameter. The effects of the agreement are much larger in Germany than in 
Chile, due to the much higher wage ceiling in Germany.  
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Table 4.3: A stylized example of calculating employer costs (per employee) for the 
case of the totalization agreements with Germany and Chile for always takers (TA 
versus no TA) and induced workers (TA versus U.S.), with employer 
compensation such that the worker is equally well off 
Partner country and 
cost comparison 
Disutility of foreign assignment 
(% of consumption) 
 0 20 50 
Germany    
Cost at age 45, U.S. 217,936.10 217,936.10 217,936.10 
Cost at age 45, no TA 241,067.61 275,792.73 369,261.05 
Cost at age 45, TA 217,936.10 252,571.75 346,036.88 
    
noTA - U.S. 23,131.51 57,856.63 151,324.95 
TA - U.S. 0 34,635.65 128,100.78 
TA - no TA -23,131.51 -23,220.98 -23,224.17 
    
Chile    
Cost at age 45, U.S. 240,713.44 240,713.44 240,713.44 
Cost at age 45, no TA 248,244.49 286,280.96 388,658.64 
Cost at age 45, TA 240,713.44 278,751.68 381,127.58 
    
noTA - U.S. 7,531.05 45,567.52 147,945.20 
TA - U.S. 0 38,038.24 140,414.14 
TA - no TA -7,531.05 -7,529.28 -7,531.06 
Note. U.S. = always working in the U.S. TA = foreign assignment with totalization agreement; 
no TA = foreign assignment without totalization agreement 
 
Note that the totalization agreement’s implied benefits for always takers in this 
model (see the rows “TA – no TA”) are similar to the figures reported in Table 4.1 (see 
column Yi). When assuming no disutility of foreign assignment, the Table 4.1 estimate 
of $22,431 is very close to the model estimate of $23,132; while the estimate for Chile, 
$4,875, is lower than the $7,531 from the model. 
From these estimates, we learned a number of important lessons which have 
practical implications for conducting totalization agreements cost-benefit analyses 
beyond Chile and Germany: 
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1. The always takers’ implied benefit from the estimation of the micromodel is 
remarkably similar to the more naïve calculations presented in Table 4.1. This 
is encouraging for anyone using this framework to conduct an analysis and 
who is unable to estimate a micromodel such as this one. This would be the 
case, for example, for someone conducting a prospective cost-benefit analysis. 
2. As in 1, the fact that the estimated retirement age did not change in the 
specifications, shows that using the simple calculations above can provide a 
good approximation to actual benefits 
3. Allowing for foreign assignment disutility affects the benefit computation, but 
the results are not dramatically affected. The estimates with disutility are within 
5% of the estimates without disutility. This again shows the robustness of the 
microestimates and the estimates from Table 4.1 
4.2.3 Valuing the Impacts on the finances of Social Security agencies in home and partner 
countries 
Totalization agreements allow some expatriate workers to avoid paying taxes to 
two social security administrations. This implies that totalization agreements reduce 
some of the contributions that the agencies would otherwise receive from these 
workers. As shown in in the second row (red) in Table 4.4 below (a summary of Table 
2.1), the Social Security Administration loses the taxes paid by the always takers foreign 
expatriates in the U.S.  
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Table 4.4: Social Security taxes: Effects of a Totalization agreement. Stylized case 
based on the agreements with Germany 
Type of worker Without TA With TA 
Americans working abroad 
temporarily (<5 years) for U.S. 
firm and self-employed 
(temporarily)  
Pay OASDI taxes 
Pay foreign taxes  
Pay OASDI taxes 
Do not pay foreign taxes 
Foreign nationals working 
temporarily in the U.S. 
Pay OASDI taxes  Do not pay OASDI taxes 
 
The calculation for the amount lost is similar to the one done in section 4.1.1 
above. The social security tax rate r equals 6.2 and is the same as that levied on the 
employer, so that r + rf = 12.4.  
The income on which the taxes are levied, (1 + Δ)Yi in this case, equals the 
income for the foreign always taker expat, up to the wage ceiling in the U.S., which in 
2020 equaled $137,700. We do not have data on the earnings of German expatriates 
with certificates in the U.S. Given that Germany has a similar level of economic 
development as the U.S., and that the earnings of American expatriates in Germany by 
far exceed the wage ceilings of both countries, it is reasonable to assume that the 
earnings of the German expatriates will be close to or exceed the wage ceiling of the 
U.S. Hence, we take (1 + Δ)Yi to equal $137,700.  
Using data from SSA, Prados et al. (2019) report an average of 2,325 foreign 
certificates issued annually in Germany. If workers stay an average of five years that 
would imply an average of 11,625 German expatriates in any given year. If as above, 
we assume that the always takers represent about 80% of the German expatriates in 
the U.S., that would mean that 9,300 Germans would have contributed to the Social 
Security Administration’s OASDI trust funds.  
These numbers are shown in table form in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: A stylized example of valuing the financial costs to the SSA from the 
foregone revenue from the always taker partner-country expatriates, which is also 

















Germany 6.2% 6.2* 137,700  17,075 0.8*11,625=9,300 158.8 M 
Chile 6.2% 6.2* 137,700  17,075 N/A N/A 
Notes: a This is the wage ceiling applicable in the U.S. in 2020. b This was calculated by 
multiplying the inverse of the expected effect of TAs on expat flows ~0.8 (see next section) 
times the number of foreign CoC for Germany from the U.S. 
 
As discussed above, the existence of employer compensation for social security 
taxes can imply a further benefit for always taker expatriates from reduced income tax 
liability  and a mirror cost for the other country’s pubic finance. Below, we conduct the 
comparable calculation for the partner country’s benefit for this concept, which is also a 
cost for the U.S. in terms of foregone revenue. The calculations in Table 4.6 show that 
for Germany, expatriates and their employers benefit from an additional 23.9M of 
foregone revenue to the IRS.  
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Table 4.6: Additional benefits to partner-country Always takers and their 
employers arising from a reduction in income taxes from the drop in Δ 
Country τa Υib Δ ΝΑ Total direct 
benefit (in USD 
millions) 
Germany 0.17 137,700 0.11 9,300 23.9 
Chile 0.18 137,700 0.11 N/A N/A 
Note: a We use the single filer income tax rate schedule for federal income tax rates in the U.S. 
and a standard deduction of $12,200; average (Medicare) earnings (data from SSA) of 
American expatriates to Germany and Chile who have average earnings of 209,399 and 
235,000, respectively. b We use the wage ceiling applicable in the U.S. in 2020.  
4.2.4 Revenue loss for U.S. governments from the additional compensation, which is also the 
additional benefit to  partner-country “always taker” expatriates 
Suppose we are interested in analyzing the SSA’s revenue loss from a 
prospective totalization agreement with a potential candidate country. One needs two 
pieces of data: 1) the number of individuals from that country who would be sent to the 
U.S., and 2) the expatriates’ average earnings.  
While in this case data from certificates of coverage do not exist, we could 
approximate the number with the number of individuals with short-term work visas (E-1, 
E-2, H1-B, H1-B1, H2-D, L-1 and L-2) from that country. This number can be obtained 
from the U.S. Department of State. However, this may be better viewed as an upper 
bound since some in those visas may have been hired by an American employer, stay 
longer than five years, or may otherwise not be covered by the totalization agreement. 
For the average earnings, one may use the wage ceiling as managers tend to 
have earnings that surpassed it, as we have discussed. 
The income lost for the partner country’s social security agency is the mirror 
image of the benefit accrued to the home country’s always workers and their employers. 
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As described above (see Table 4.1) in the example calculation for Germany, this would 
imply a revenue loss of $183.1 million.  
4.3 Valuing the Impacts of totalization agreements through the added expatriate worker 
effect  
In this section, we discuss how one could estimate the value of the direct benefits 
accrued through American workers “induced” to being sent abroad by their employers, 
and foreign workers being sent here by their own employers. 
As above, accounting for this benefit requires an estimate of the magnitude of the 
workers’ benefits as well as an estimate of the agreement’s impact on the number of 
increased worker flow. An approximation of the total value for this matrix cell could be 
expressed as NI×TI, where NI is the total number of workers induced to work in the 
partner country, and TI is the average benefit, or shadow price, per induced worker. 
4.3.1 Estimates of totalization agreement’s impact on worker flows: the number of “induced” 
workers  
Before delving into our benefit estimate, we note that there is little evidence of an 
agreement’s effect on these flows. Prados et al. (2019) find no clear pattern on 
employment of multi, neither for American nor foreign firms, though we acknowledge 
that, due to sample size, meaningful impacts cannot be ruled out. The reason for this 
lack of effect may be noisy estimates derived from relatively small sample sizes. (The 
sample is limited to the number of countries that have signed an agreement.) 
Absent a good estimate of this effect, one option is to use a lower and an upper 
bound and assess whether that affects the overall direction of the cost-benefit analysis. 
The lower bound could be zero given that the prior empirical study was unable to 
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establish statistically significant effects. For an upper-bound, an option could be to use 
the proportion of post- to pre-levels of employment flows after a totalization agreement. 
Among the individual country cases analyzed in Prados et al. (2019), Poland had the 
largest increase in workers claiming the foreign-earned income exclusion around the 
years of the totalization agreement’s signing, though the data is missing for some years. 
Even in this case, one can bound the increase to no more than 40,000, which would 
represent an increase of about 40%.16  
We include the lack of knowledge of this number as an important research gap 
in the literature. 
4.3.2 Estimating the benefit for the “induced” worker 
As described in the previous chapter, valuing the benefit for employees who 
become expatriates due to the totalization agreement is more challenging, as the 
benefit to them lies somewhere between 0 and the value for the always takers.  
Our micromodel is of some use here, but with some limitations. Our previous 
calculations with the model assumed that the employer exactly compensates the worker 
for the loss of (lifetime) utility. Hence, the worker is indifferent about being sent abroad 
or not and does not gain from the totalization agreement. Instead, the benefits of the 
agreement are for the employer. For the employers of the always takers, the benefits 
are necessarily positive, and Table 4.7 gives some tentative estimates of these. The 
table also shows the cost differences that are relevant for the induced workers. These 
                                               
16 While the number of employees of American affiliates who filed for the foreign-earned income 
inclusion was significantly higher in the first year after the totalization agreement, it is notable 
that there was an increasing trend both before and after the signing. This strengthens the idea 
that this number should be taken as an upper-bound rather than an estimate of the number. 
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would (by definition) stay in the U.S. without a totalization agreement, but work in the 
partner country with the agreement. With the compensation necessary, this implies 
additional costs to the employer under a TA, for example, $34,636 if the worker’s 
disutility of foreign assignment in Germany is equal to a 20% drop in consumption. For 
induced workers, this implies that the worker’s additional productivity for the firm must 
be higher than $34,636, because otherwise, it would be more profitable for the firm to 
keep the worker in the U.S. In the absence of a totalization agreement, the additional 
cost for this worker in Germany, relative to the U.S., would be $57,857. Because by the 
definition of an induced worker, the worker would not be sent to Germany in the 
absence of a totalization agreement, the additional productivity of the worker for the firm 
must be lower than $57,857. Thus, we have a lower and an upper bound of the 
additional productivity of the worker in Germany. The additional firm costs under the 
totalization agreement are $34,636. The net benefit of the agreement for the firm is 
equal to the additional productivity minus the additional cost. Given the bounds on the 
former, we conclude that this is bounded by $34,636 - $34,636 = $0 and $57,857 - 
$34,636 = $23,221, which is the benefit for an always taker. So, this again affirms that 
the benefits for an induced worker are bounded by $0 and the benefits for an always 
taker. To obtain a more precise estimate, we need more information about the 
productivity of the worker in the U.S. and in Germany. This is outside the model’s 
purview and requires external information. 
While not entirely satisfactory, having bounds in some of these parameters may 
be useful to draw conclusions from cost-benefit analysis as long as the bounds are 
small relative to the gap between the rest of the benefits and the costs.  
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Table 4.7. Bounds for the benefit estimates for induced workers in Germany  
and Chile 
 Lower Bound Mid-point Higher Bound 
Germany    
Per induced worker 0 $11,610 $23,221 
 
Total benefit  
(assuming 20% of expatriates are 
induced workers) 
0 $27.0M $54.0M 
Chile    
Per induced worker 0 $3,765 $7,531 
 
Total benefit  
(assuming 20% of expatriates are 
induced workers) 
0 0.78M 1.54M 
 
The model  delivers more specific partial estimates if the employer offers the 
foreign assignment regardless of the TA, but does not necessarily compensate the 
worker optimally for lost utility, and allows the worker to decline the assignment. For 
example, suppose that the employer offers the foreign assignment with a fixed 
compensation of 20% of regular earnings. We can then compute lifetime utility in the 
U.S. (without the 20%) and lifetime utility with the period in the partner country, with the 
20%, both with the totalization agreement and without. For an induced worker, we 
should see that the worker declines the foreign assignment in the absence of a 
totalization agreement but accepts it with the agreement. Hence, lifetime utility is 
highest with the foreign assignment and the totalization agreement, less in the U.S., and 
lowest with the foreign assignment but without the totalization agreement. The relevant 
comparison for the worker is the lifetime utility with the foreign assignment and the 
agreement versus a lifetime in the U.S. We can compute those utilities, but they have 
no easy interpretation. To interpret them, we could, for example, calculate what 
increase in U.S. earnings would give the worker the same lifetime utility as with the 
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foreign assignment under the totalization agreement. We can then cast the totalization 
agreement’s value to the worker in terms of an equivalent earnings increase in dollars 
or percentage. 
We have not done these computations for several related reasons. First, this is 
suboptimal behavior for the firm. They would either overpay the worker or leave the 
opportunity to increase profits (by increasing the worker’s compensation package on 
foreign assignment) unused. Second, the human resources literature shows that tax 
equalization and similar components, as well as other additional payments, are very 
common among multinational firms that send their employees abroad (KPMG 
International, 2019, p. 80), so empirically the current scenario is less relevant. Third, 
calculations of this sort omit the benefits of increased productivity (and hence, profits) 
on the firm. The bounds calculated earlier do explicitly or implicitly include these 
components and, therefore, are more accurate representations of what we may know 
about the agreement’s costs and benefits, even if they do not lead to a single number. 
  
53 
4.3 Valuing the benefits and costs of the totalization provision  
The Social Security Administration keeps records on the number of totalization 
beneficiaries and the average benefit for each of the countries with which they maintain 
an agreement. Hence, valuing the cells for the cost to SSA from this concept for existing 
totalization agreement can be done. 
The SSA’s cost is approximated by multiplying the number of beneficiaries times 
the average monthly benefit. Table 4.8 below shows the values for the U.S. with a 
number of countries. In particular, it shows the average number of beneficiaries per year 
by host country in 2018. These numbers are published in SSA’s Annual Supplemental 
Report. Jackson and Cash (2018) provide some detailed explanation of the formula 
used by SSA and partner countries to pro-rate totalization monthly benefits. 
The highlighted rows show the cases for the countries used as case studies 
throughout the paper. There were 22,126 people receiving monthly benefits who were 
able to do so via the totalization agreement with Germany, across the different social 
security programs (retired workers, disabled workers, spouses, widow(er)s, and 




Table 4.8: Valuing the benefit and costs of the “totalization” effects from 
totalization agreements 
Country Number of 
beneficiaries in 2018 
Average monthly 
benefit (in  
USD) 
Total (yearly) 
implied benefit for 
former workers and 
cost for SSA 
(In Millions USD) 
Australia            5,371  245.34 15.8 
Austria            1,757  250.66 5.3 
Belgium            1,147  256.42 3.5 
Canada          53,342  237.74 152.2 
Chile               361  278.11 1.2 
Czech Republic               177  273.3 0.6 
Denmark               914  243.23 2.7 
Finland               507  262.75 1.6 
France            7,244  265.34 23.1 
Germany          22,126  275.48 73.1 
Greece            6,036  227.84 16.5 
Hungary                 39  227.42 0.1 
Ireland            3,674  247.91 10.9 
Italy          10,179  225.21 27.5 
Japan          63,713  272.27 208.2 
Luxembourg                 90  288.26 0.3 
Netherlands            3,710  247.93 11.0 
Norway            4,279  239.15 12.3 
Poland          15,167  135.4 24.6 
Portugal            2,370  282.51 8.0 
Slovakia                 37  244.33 0.1 
South Korea            3,277  235.78 9.3 
Spain            4,159  233.06 11.6 
Sweden            4,384  222.37 11.7 
Switzerland            4,359  238.17 12.5 
United Kingdom          18,249  321.2 70.3 
Total        236,668  251.44 714.1 
Note. These numbers are based on Table 5m from the Social Security Administration Annual 
Supplement Report (SSA 2018a). They include numbers from all categories: retired workers, 
disabled workers, spouses, widow(er)s, and children. Retired workers represent 65% of these 
beneficiaries overall. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this cost mirrors the benefit for the former 
workers, including the domestic and partner country nationals. As described in earlier 
chapters, Americans can also receive benefits from the partner country via totalization if 
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it allows them to meet the minimum contribution period. While we do not have data to 
approximate partner countries’ disbursements, one very rough approximation would be 
to assume it is symmetric, so that the same proportion and benefit amounts of partner 
country nationals from SSA exactly compensates the amounts Americans receive from 
the partner country. The numbers from Table 4.8 would also serve as the benefits 
estimate for American totalization beneficiaries. In that case, former American workers 
benefit from the totalization with Germany by 73.1M. 
For a prospective totalization agreement, obtaining precise data of the workers or 
former workers who could benefit by totalizing benefits could be extremely challenging 
or even impossible. It would require counting or estimating the number of people who 
have contributed to the prospective partner country but who would fall short of credits to 
qualify for benefits in the U.S. A more promising avenue would be to create an estimate 
based on the data presented above for countries with existing totalization agreements. 
By selecting the countries that have the closest economic similarities, and appropriately 
adjusting for population size and perhaps other variables, one could create an estimate 
that is, perhaps, close enough. 
4.4 Assessing costs and benefits form the macroeconomic impacts of totalization 
agreements  
Estimating the effects on trade and economy as a whole is more complex, as 
there are no data directly linking trade or output to totalization agreements. Hence, we 
need to base our estimates, or ranges of estimates, on econometric estimates or 
economic modeling done in prior studies. There are very few studies on totalization 
agreements’ impacts of. Among the few is Seshadri (2019), which studies totalization 
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agreements’ effects on exports, imports, and Foreign Direct Investments; and Prados et 
al. (2019), which also studies Foreign Direct Investments and develops an international 
equilibrium model for worker flows and trade. 
4.4.1 Effects on trade and multinational production 
Seshadri (2019) employs a synthetic control methodology as in Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003). This essentially consists of a difference-in-differences 
methodology, but the control countries are replaced for a weighted average of the pool 
of possible controls, and the weights are chosen to maximize the similarities in trends in 
the “pre” period. 
The study presents the following main findings. First, on average, totalization 
agreements lead to a reduction in exports over the five-year period following an 
agreement’s signing of an agreement. Second, agreements also lead to an increase in 
imports, though this effect is small and insignificant.17 Third, the export impacts were 
heterogeneous across agreements, with some of the agreements raising exports, and 
some reducing them (though increasing them on average). With some countries, 
agreements have led to increases in exports; for others, they have led to increases in 
imports. There is not an obvious pattern linking the country’s characteristics with the 
higher effect on exports or imports.  
From the cost-benefit analysis perspective, it is useful to note that these results 
necessarily imply mirror images for the foreign stakeholders. The same agreements that 
increase exports to the partner country, increase imports from the U.S. in the partner 
country. 
                                               
17 Seshadri (2019) also studies FDI, but we discuss that in the following subsection. 
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Assessing the costs and benefits of trade is not straightforward, but it’s important 
to avoid the mistake of equating exports as a positive and imports as a negative, as in 
mercantilist ideas. Economic models have traditionally assessed gains from trade. 
Increased imports may reflect benefits to consumers who enjoy the additional 
consumption options, and/or benefits for firms able to access additional inputs or 
intermediate goods in the production process. 
It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the benefit arising from trade. From the 
perspective of the BC framework, it is best to not attempt to quantify the benefits for 
specific firms, but rather to assign an overall “gains to trade” amount for the cell that 
corresponds to the column “U.S. population at large” from Table 3.6.  
4.4.2 Effects on Foreign Direct Investment 
We have two sources of findings for the effect on FDI. The microeconometric 
approach in Seshadri (2019) yields the finding that totalization agreements lead to an 
increase in FDI (that is, an outflow of investments from the U.S. to other countries). 
Prados et al. (2019) assessed the likely macroeconomic impact of totalization 
agreements. They follow two separate approaches to study these impacts. The first 
consists of an analysis of the data’s empirical patterns using an event study analysis of 
totalization agreements around their implementation dates. This event study analysis 
shows that for both American firms’ affiliates abroad and foreign firms in the U.S., total 
assets increase around the agreement’s implementation. Estimates from a regression 
analysis showed a large and statistically significant effect on outgoing FDI. For incoming 
FDI, the effects are not significant even though the positive coefficients are large, due to 
large standard errors in the estimates. 
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The second approach uses a stylized macroeconomic model of multinational firm 
production, extended to account for the totalization agreements’ effects on firms’ 
incentives. The international relocation of managerial effort depends on the differences 
across countries in terms of taxes on foreign managers, factor endowments, and the 
relative country-specific productivity. 
That model, summarized in Appendix II, assumes that totalization agreements 
lower the cost of relocating labor abroad and American firms can use their know-how in 
foreign subsidiaries and branches by sending managerial capacity abroad. These 
international movements of managerial efforts allow American firms to expand their 
multinational production. The model shows that such an agreement, by decreasing the 
cost of relocating productive inputs across borders, increases the flows of foreign capital 
and investments that a country receives.  
The share of foreign firm-embedded production in a host country is higher when 
the country is more productive, when it has more capital and labor and less managerial 
capacity relative to the source country, when the taxes on foreign management are 
lower in the host country, and when the taxes on own management are higher in the 
source country. As a result, the FDI flows of U.S. firms increase with the enactment of 
totalization agreements. The model predicts that the increase in the share of foreign-
controlled capital in a (host) country, given a decrease in the tax on foreign managers in 
that country, will be higher the more productive is the host country’s economy, the less 
productive is the source country, the higher is the ratio of the workforce size in the host 
country relative to the source country, and the higher is the source country’s tax on local 
managers. 
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Table 4.9 shows quantitative examples of the sensitivity of the change in the 
share of foreign-controlled capital in partner countries due to the implementation of a 
totalization agreement. It reflects the results from simulations of equilibria with and 
without totalization agreement with two U.S. partner countries, Germany and Chile. The 
exercise for Chile uses data at the moment of the agreement’s signing in 2001 to 
simulate the impact of the treaty. Because the treaty with Germany was enacted in 1979 
and not all the necessary data is available for that year, we use data from 2015 to 
simulate the effects of removing the agreement. In these cases, the model indicates that 
totalization agreements with the U.S. led to an increase in the net FDI of the U.S. to 
these partner countries. The results from these simulations indicate that the profits of 
American firms engaged in additional multinational production are 15.6% and 7.3% 
higher as a consequence of the totalization agreements with Chile and Germany, 
respectively. 
These examples show the change in the net flow of FDI with respect to the host 
country’s capital stock (variable s in the model) due to a totalization agreement. Table 
4.9 also shows how sensitive that change in s is with respect to the host country’s 
productivity and its local tax on managers.  
By decreasing the costs of sending workers abroad, totalization agreements 
affected American firms’ incentives to relocate production abroad. Because payroll 
taxes are higher in Germany than Chile, this channel through which the agreements 
affect FDI is stronger in the case of U.S. investments in Germany than with Chile. 
Presumably because of this, the effect of a totalization agreement with that country is 
more sensitive to payroll taxes and productivity than the case of Chile. 
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Table 4.9: Sensitivity of changes in share of U.S. FDI to partner countries’ level of 
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The quantitative exercises in Prados et al. (2019) indicate that the totalization 
agreement with Japan increased the incentives of Japanese firms to reallocate their 
operations to the U.S., resulting in net inward investment flows from Japan to the U.S. 
For Chile, however, the totalization agreement made it more profitable for American 
firms to send managers and investments to their Chilean affiliates. These exercises 
indicate that the direction of the net effect depends on the partner country’s relative 
characteristics. The counterfactual exercise with Germany simulated the effects of 
removing the existing totalization agreement. This simulation predicts that if the 
agreement were removed, U.S. firms would decrease their investments in their German 
affiliates and German firms would increase flows of capital and investment to the U.S. 
The results suggest that this agreement almost evens out German investments in the 
U.S. and U.S. investments in Germany (due to the channels considered within the 
model), preventing the U.S. from being a net receptor of German investments. 
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These exercises indicate that totalization agreements with Germany and Chile 
contributed to a decrease of the U.S. trade balance and an increase of the U.S. capital 
account and Gross National Product, which implies an increased domestic absorption 
due to the extra payments from factors abroad. According to these exercises, the 
totalization agreement with Japan had the opposite effect: It increased the U.S. trade 
balance, decreased the U.S. capital account and decreased U.S. domestic absorption.  
Overall, the admittedly scarce literature seems to suggest we should expect 
macroeconomic effects from the totalization agreements. The literature, however, 
provides weak evidence on which to base the quantification of the benefits to the overall 
population. There are two reasons for this: First, the estimates of the macroeconomic 
impacts are both imprecise and uncertain. Second, the effects of aggregate changes 
are not straightforward to add to the cost-benefit calculations because the valuation 
after eliminating double-counting is not obvious; it would depend on the weight given to 
the economy’s different stakeholders. 
However, it does seem safe to conclude that there are some impacts that would 
increase the ratio of benefits to costs. We suggest considering adding such values with 
a large margin of error, and assessing the extent to which the overall conclusion of the 
cost-benefit analysis at hand remains robust.  
5. Summary of estimates  
Chapter 4 had two purposes: provide some examples of estimates for existing 
agreements as well as provide some discussion of how estimates could be obtained for 
prospective analyses. Throughout Chapter 4, we were careful to describe the caveats of 
the estimates we have produced. Here, we provide a summary of these estimates, 
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which we use to illustrate how these can be pulled together. The objective is not to emit 
some judgement about a particular agreement, but rather to show what can be done 
with what we currently know.  
Take the case of Germany, which we illustrate with Table 5.1 below. We 
estimated the following direct benefits: $183.1 million for always takers and their firms, a 
number that we showed was very similar to what was obtained from our example micro 
model; $25.3 million also for this group from the reduction of income tax from the 
additional compensation (Table 4.2); and $73.1 million for former workers who are able 
to “totalize” their benefits (Table 4.8). In addition, we estimate a benefit for induced 
expatriates of between $0 and $54 million, with a midpoint of $27 million (Table 4.7) 
However, we know this is very tentative due to a lack of a solid estimate on the number 
of induced workers. On the cost side, we estimate the SSA would face foregone 
revenue of $158.8 million from German always taker expatriates (Table 4.5) and $73.1 
million for totalized benefits. The federal government would lose an extra $23.9M from 
foregone income tax revenue from the reduction in compensation (Table 4.6). Overall, 
we have accounted for a total benefit for U.S. stakeholders of $309 million, which 
surpasses the total cost of $256 million. To the extent that we expect the 
macroeconomic impacts to be a net-positive due to the efficiency gains discussed 
earlier, this would lend support for the idea that benefits would surpass costs, though of 
course the extent of that difference depends on the magnitude of the benefits from the 
macro gains. This analysis is summarized in Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of estimated benefits and costs, the case of Germany. 
Effect group 
Benefits and costs for home-country stakeholders (millions of U.S. 
dollars) 
U.S. expats and 
their employers; and 

















“induced” expats 27 -- -- 
Macroeconomic 
effects: Trade, FDI 
and others 
  
Evidence of incremental economic 
activity, no reliable quantitative 
impacts.  
 
Of course, cost-benefit analyses do not always give clear cut answers on 
whether the benefits of an agreement will be higher than the costs for a country’s 
stakeholders. One could do an analysis like the one above for a fictional country that 
sends many more people to the U.S. than vice-versa. A situation like this would most 
likely result in the costs from foregone revenue to SSA to be much higher than the 
benefits to the lower number of American always takers and induced expatriates. Still, 
even in this case, it is possible that efficiency gains may result in an overall benefit if the 
macroeconomic gains are large enough. 
The following chapter identifies the knowledge gaps that would help to fill the 
unknowns and produce better cost-benefit analyses. 
6. Knowledge gaps  
According to the framework, we have identified a number of areas for which there 
is substantial knowledge and areas where there has been more limited research. With 
the existing research and data, it is possible to assess the benefits and costs to the 
64 
always takers workers and the fiscal position of the social security programs. With 
lesser certainty, it is also possible to assess the effects on a number of macroeconomic 
outcomes.  
As part of this research, we aimed to cover the gap by providing some estimates 
of induced workers’ benefits. However, to obtain a value for the matrix cell 
corresponding to “induced” expatriate workers, it is necessary to have an idea of the 
totalization agreements’ effects on worker flows. While prior research (Prados et al., 
2019) attempted to estimate this through difference-in-difference regression techniques, 
that methodology was not able to detect an effect statistically different from zero. If the 
effect is indeed zero, then the cost-benefit analysis is substantially simplified. From 
those results, however, one cannot rule out effects below the threshold for statistical 
significance. Hence, there is a need for further research into totalization 
agreements’ impacts on the magnitude of the worker flows. While, the difference-
in-differences approach has perhaps been exhausted, there may be some other 
approaches that may prove to be successful. One avenue may be case-study 
approaches looking at data for individual firms with operations in countries with recently 
signed agreements.  
Strong assumptions are currently needed to estimate the cost to the foreign 
country’s social security institutions from the totalization provision disbursements. 
More research into that would aid in more accurately assessing the benefit from that 
provision to American beneficiaries. 
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7. Conclusions 
We have provided a detailed framework for the analysis of costs and benefits of 
totalization agreements. We have identified the main stakeholders and their direct and 
indirect cost and benefit components. We believe this framework may be helpful for 
analysts and policymakers in evaluating current and prospective totalization 
agreements. By summarizing what is known in terms of research and data, and by 
putting it together in a cost-benefit framework, this work may help in the assessment of 
potential impacts, depending on the partner country’s characteristics and how they 
affect different stakeholders.  
We have illustrated the approach with tentative calculations for the agreements 
with Germany and Chile. These were done for illustration purposes and depend on 
strong assumptions and simplifications. A thorough evaluation of a specific existing or 
proposed agreement would ideally be based on richer information than we had access 
to. We have identified likely impacts of these agreements and the research gaps most 
important for conducting a cost-benefit analysis, which may serve as a roadmap for 
future research. 
While we do not know everything that would be needed to conduct a full cost 
benefit analysis, we know enough to produce estimates of costs and benefits to fill a 
substantial fraction of the cost-benefit framework. In some cases, this will be enough to 
lead to clear conclusions about whether benefits are high enough to justify the costs of 
enacting a cost-benefit analysis. As always, there are trade-offs: some stakeholders will 
benefit while others are worse off by the introduction of the agreement. Determining 
whether the benefits outweigh the costs is outside the scope of our report. But the 
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considerations and calculations outlined in this report may provide decision makers with 
the background needed to make these evaluations. 
Cost-benefit analyses are of interest from a positive rather than normative 
perspective, too. Using a framework the one we developed here can help identify where 
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Appendix I. Description of the model of individual international 
workers 
As emphasized in the text, this model is highly stylized, but nevertheless contains 
several aspects that are relevant for modeling effects a totalization agreement’s on the 
individual. The model focuses on a U.S.-based worker who may temporarily work in a 
foreign country during part of their working life. As is common in this type of model, we 
assume the individual maximizes lifetime utility, which in our model is 
𝑉𝑉0 = �𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎





where a is age (normalized such that a = 0 when entering the labor force, although this 
is only for notational convenience), T the length of life, 𝛽𝛽 the discount factor, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 is 
consumption, 𝛾𝛾 is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (higher 
values of this mean stronger preferences for smooth consumption patterns across the 
life cycle), 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎 is an indicator for whether one works (1) or not (0), and 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 is an indicator 
for whether one temporarily works in a foreign country (1) or not (0). The parameter 𝜙𝜙 
reflects the disutility of working and 𝜔𝜔 reflects the disutility (or utility, if negative) of being 
on a temporary foreign assignment. Our model assumes that the individual works in 
each period before retirement age R and does not work (is retired) from age R onward, 
and that the individual starts claiming Social Security at the same time as retiring. The 
model contains a standard equation for returns on assets and the budget constraint that 
assets at the end of life need to be zero (or positive), but no other borrowing constraints.  
The model requires as input a sequence of gross earnings at each age (if the 
individual would work at that age). Net earnings are obtained from slightly simplified 
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formulas reflecting U.S. federal income and payroll taxes in 2019, preserving 
progressivity of income taxes and the Social Security taxable maximum, as well as 
potential foreign payroll taxes. It assumes that the U.S. has an income tax treaty with 
the foreign country, with foreign income tax rates not exceeding U.S. income tax rates, 
so the total amount of income tax is equal to the income tax liability if the individual 
worked in the U.S. with the same earnings. It would be fairly straightforward to modify 
the code to accommodate additional foreign income taxes as well. 
Social Security benefits are calculated using (1) a slightly simplified average 
indexed monthly earnings (AIME) formula, in which indexation and cost of living 
adjustments are absent (so the model is in real, rather than nominal, dollars, and it is 
assumed that growth of the average wage is the same as inflation), (2) the resulting 
primary insurance amount (PIA), and (3) the applicable adjustments for early or late 
claiming, depending on claiming age R. The model assumes that the individual is not 
eligible for foreign Social Security benefits. Private pensions are not explicitly included 
in the model, so they are implicitly assumed to be part of assets, that is, a defined 
contribution type, (e.g., 401(k)), without modeling the differential tax treatment of such 
plans compared to, say, regular savings accounts. 
We calculate the individual’s optimal decisions given the model, its parameters, 
and the auxiliary inputs. These decisions entail retirement age R and consumption in 
each period, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎. Savings, assets, taxes paid, benefits received, and utility are computed 
as functions of the inputs and the optimal decisions. If the individual has a choice 
regarding whether to accept the foreign assignment or not, we can compute lifetime 
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utility with and without the foreign assignment and then accept or decline the foreign 
assignment depending on which has higher lifetime utility.  
We can find the extra compensation needed if any for a foreign assignment by 
finding the (minimal) percentage earnings increase during the foreign assignment 
necessary such that the individual prefers the foreign assignment. We can do this 
separately without a totalization agreement and with such an agreement, which gives us 
the earnings during the assignment with and without TA. We also can find the effects for 
the always takers by calculating the employer cost (earnings and employer part of 
payroll taxes) in both cases and their difference. 
If the employer is unable or unwilling to pay the additional earnings and taxes for 
the worker, the worker stays in the U.S. The introduction of the TA can then shift the 
balance, leading to the induced worker effect. 
We used this model for some of the illustrative calculations presented in the main 
text, as indicated there. For these calculations, we took typical values of the parameters 
as found in the literature, or adaptations thereof that better reflected the (higher) 
incomes of typical U.S. expatriates, as discussed in the text. The only parameter for 
which we have not derived a value from the literature is the foreign assignment’s 
disutility(𝜔𝜔). This likely varies greatly between individuals and depends on many factors, 
including purchasing power in the partner country and other characteristics that may 
make certain countries attractive and others unattractive. Therefore, in the text, we 
report calculations based on different values of this parameter to illustrate the range of 
results one may find. 
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Appendix II. Results from the model of multinational production 
The model in Prados et al. (2019) assumes there is a single, freely traded 
consumption good produced by firms using capital services, labor services, and 
leadership. There are two types of employees in a firm: workers (who provide the labor 
services) and managers (who make decisions for the firm and provide know-how and 
management skills). We reproduce here the model specifications for convenience. 
The output of a firm that has x units of management know-how, l units of labor, 
and k units of physical capital, and is operating in country i is given by 𝑦𝑦 =
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜈𝜈(𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝜈𝜈 , where 𝑣𝑣 ∈ (0,1) is the share of management know-how in output and 
𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜈𝜈) ∈ (0,1) is the share of physical capital in output. The term 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 reflects the 
country-specific productivity, as given by its infrastructure, laws and regulations, human 
capital levels, and other nontradeable aspects that affect production possibilities. 
Management skills x determine firm-specific productivity, and can be allocated across 
countries. When a firm from country j sends firm-embedded productivity to country i, it 
produces output 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣(𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝜈𝜈. Firms profits are 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 for locations in country i and 
𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 for affiliates in country j. 
Assuming that there are two countries, i and j, and all firms are homogeneous, 
aggregate output in country i is: 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝜈𝜈(𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝜈𝜈, where 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 represents the total net 
managerial power used in country i and 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 is the total physical capital operating in 
country i. In equilibrium, the wage for workers is 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜈𝜈) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖, the price of 
managerial know-how is given by firms’ profits 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜈𝜈𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, and the rental rate for capital 
is 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜈𝜈)𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖.  
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Due to international mobility of managers and capital, 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 and 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 may be smaller 
or larger than the country’s endowments, Xi and Ki. Analogous notation applies to 
country j. To obtain stylized results, we consider a simplified model in which the world 
consists of two countries. The two-country aggregate constraints for these factors are: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗, and 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾�𝑗𝑗 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗 . 
The worldwide equilibrium allocates management know-how by equalizing its 
net-of-tax marginal product across countries. The allocation of managerial effort across 
countries depends on their differences in terms of taxes on foreign managers, factor 
endowments, and the relative country-specific productivity. Totalization agreements 
affect the tax burden of multinational production in this model and, thus, the 
international allocation of management. 
In an interior equilibrium where country i exports firm-embedded productivity to 
country j, net-of-tax profits for managers from country i must be equal across both 
countries. In such an equilibrium, we define 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 implicitly, and the share of firm-






If the country i is a net source of managerial power, i.e., Xij>0, absorption 
(consumption plus investment) equals aggregate output minus the net payments to 
foreign factors: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+�1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠𝜈𝜈𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟∗(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 − 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖). The trade balance of country i 
is given by: 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = −�1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠𝜈𝜈𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟∗(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 − 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖) < 0, if 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 0. Thus, the model predicts 
that countries with net FDI outflows run a trade balance deficit as they have to make 
payments to foreign factors. Conversely, the country with the net FDI inflows runs a 
trade balance surplus with its partner country. 
